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TRADE CREDIT, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, AND 
SME ACCESS TO FINANCE 
 
 
I. Introduction 
As the financial crisis began to unfold in the third quarter of 2007 concern 
mounted that access to finance, particularly for SMEs (small and midsize enterprises) 
would soon tighten.  Exploiting the increasing availability of data since the inception of 
the crisis, a growing body of academic research has confirmed this conjecture.  Much of 
this research has been focused on determining the existence and magnitude of the credit 
crunch, identifying which financial institutions contracted the most, how the financial 
crisis propagated across national boundaries, and which firms were most affected.  We 
focus on a different aspect of the credit crunch:  How did firms respond to the contraction 
of credit supplied by their banks.  In particular, we assess whether bank credit constrained 
SMEs turned to the most important alternative to bank lending as a source of external 
financing, trade credit. 
 Trade credit is ubiquitous.  Behind bank lending, it is the next most important 
source of SME external financing in nearly every developed and developing economy 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 2001).  In the U.S., for example, trade credit provides 
almost as much debt financing to SMEs as bank loans -- 31.3% of total debt financing vs. 
37.2% (Berger and Udell 1998).  The importance of trade credit has not been lost on the 
academic community where a relatively larger number of papers have examined how 
trade creditors underwrite their “loans” and the extent to which they may have an 
idiosyncratic advantage over banks in extending credit.   Moreover, evidence suggests 
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that trade credit provides a safety valve for firms facing idiosyncratic liquidity shocks 
(e.g., Wilner 2000, Boissay and Gropp 2007, Cuñat 2007).   
Existing studies have also examined whether trade credit plays a similar role 
during monetary policy shocks and business downturns. Theoretical work suggests that, 
at least for some firms whose bank credit becomes constrained, trade credit is 
countercyclical (Burkart and Ellingsen 2004).  On balance, the empirical literature has 
found that trade credit usage increases in response to monetary tightening (e.g., Calomiris, 
Himmelberg and Wachtel 1995, Nielsen 2002, Choi and Kim 2005, and Demiroglu, 
James and Kizilaslan 2012).  For the most part, however, these studies are only able to 
analyze the provision of trade credit (i.e., accounts receivable) and/or the receipt of trade 
credit (i.e., accounts payable) by large firms, not SMEs, due to data limitations.  
Although the Nielsen 2002 study which uses the US Census Bureau’s QFR data on small 
firms is an exception, these data are not disaggregated.   
A few studies have looked at trade credit prior to financial crises (Love, Preve and 
Sarria-Allende 2007, and Taketa and Udell 2007).  But these studies also lack firm-level 
data on SMEs. In the only analysis of trade credit during the current financial crisis of 
which we are aware, the evidence suggests that in the U.S. stronger larger firms extended 
more trade credit and weaker larger firms received more trade credit -- Garcia-Appendini 
and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) hereafter referred to as G-M.   Our analysis differs in 
several important ways from G-M.  Most importantly our analysis focuses fundamentally 
on how trade credit affects investment (i.e., capital expenditures) by credit constrained 
firms rather than how credit flowed from liquid to constrained firms.  In this sense our 
paper is nested squarely in the literature on the real effects of the crisis on the economy 
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(e.g., Duchin et al. 2010, Almeida et al. 2012).  These real effects stem from the fact that 
trade credit can provide access to capital for firms that are unable to fund through more 
“traditional” channels (Petersen and Rajan 1997).  That is, by allowing firms to postpone 
payment for raw materials, suppliers concomitantly allow firms to avoid tapping other 
sources of finance.  For most SMEs the only other viable external source is bank debt.  
By its nature trade credit is revolving in the sense that as long as the firm pays its supplier 
within the prescribed invoice maturity, the firm is typically allowed to continue 
purchasing new material (under new invoices with the same maturity as the paid 
invoices).   
Recent studies have found evidence of considerable variance in the maturity of 
trade credit across firms.  Giannetti et al. (2007) found that in a representative sample of 
small firms the standard deviation of the maturity of trade credit was over 12 days around 
a mean maturity of about 25 days.  Our focus differs from Giannetti et al. (2007) in that 
we investigate the potential effect of an increase in the maturity of trade credit during a 
credit crunch – an increase that could be used to offset a decrease in the supply of banks 
loans – and, given that funding is fungible, whether this increase in trade credit is used to 
finance capital expenditures that would have otherwise been financed with these bank 
loans.1,2   
                                                        
1 For example, using the summary statistics from Giannetti et al. (2007) as an illustration, increasing the 
maturity of trade credit during a credit crunch by a one standard deviation from the mean would generate 
funding equal to almost 50% of existing trade credit.  That is, for a firm with $1 million of accounts 
payable this would generate $500,000 of financing that could replace a $500,000 contraction of trade credit.  
This funding would come from 12 days of cash flow that would have otherwise been used to pay invoices 
due in 25 days (that are now due in 37 days). 
2Although Duchin et al. (2010) and Almeida et al. (2012) do not analyze trade credit, they both investigate 
financing alternatives in the context of the financial crisis.  These two papers find that for large firms in the 
U.S. the impact of the crisis on investment was related to debt maturity (i.e., the more short term debt or the 
more that long debt is currently maturing, the less investment).  Our analysis focuses on much smaller firms 
who typically do not have access to general purpose long term debt (e.g., Carey et al. 1992, Berger and 
Udell 1998) and for whom trade credit is the only major alternative source of debt (Berger and Udell 1998).  
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In addition, our paper focuses on the most vulnerable segment of the market, 
SMEs.  This SME focus is missing in G-M’s study on this current crisis – and is missing 
in all other studies of trade credit during prior macro shocks.  As a result until our study 
we can only speculate on whether an increase in the supply of trade credit cushions the 
contraction of bank credit to credit constrained SMEs after macro-shocks.  That is G-M 
and other prior studies on trade credit only tell us that certain types of large firms extend 
more trade credit during macro shocks – but whether this increase in trade credit went to 
SMEs and, more importantly, whether it went to credit constrained SMEs. 
We address this important gap in the literature by exploiting a large database that 
includes panel financial statement and banking relationship data on nearly 40,000 firms 
in Spain over the period 1994-2010. In many countries, including the U.S., firm-level 
data sets during the financial crisis such as ours simply do not exist.  In addition, we 
employ for the first time in the trade credit literature a disequilibrium model methodology 
that extracts from financial statement data estimates of credit demand and supply in order 
to identify credit constrained (i.e., vulnerable) SMEs.  We then use this result to examine 
how funding differs between two types of SMEs, unconstrained firms and constrained 
firms; and how this difference changes from pre- to post-crisis.   
We find that unconstrained firms depend more on bank financing to fund capital 
expenditure while constrained firms depend more on trade credit.  More precisely, for 
unconstrained firms, bank funding predicts capital expenditure (but not trade credit) and 
for constrained firms, trade credit predicts capital expenditure (but not bank loans).  We 
also find that the magnitude of these effects increases during the credit crunch.  Taken 
                                                                                                                                                                     
In effect, we test whether trade credit can act in a crisis as a source of financing for long-term investment.  
That is, we test whether the strong relationships between clients and suppliers that allow trade credit to be 
rolled over enable trade credit to provide funding for long-term investments. 
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together our analysis indicates three things:  i) financially constrained firms are more 
dependent on trade credit to make their investment decisions; ii) the financial crisis was 
associated with a credit crunch that affected the SME sector by increasing the number of 
credit constrained firms; and, iii) capital expenditure sensitivity to trade credit increased 
during the crisis period. 
Spain is a particularly interesting venue for studying this phenomenon for several 
reasons.  Beyond just its data advantages, Spain now plays a critical role in the health of 
the European Monetary Union.  Unlike some of the other hardest hit EMU economies 
such as Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, Spain is large enough to affect the ultimate 
fate of the Euro.  Moreover, a major component of its banking system, the cajas savings 
banks, imploded creating one of the most serious credit crunch conditions in this crisis 
(see Illueca, Norden and Udell 2014).   
Our paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we briefly discuss the streams 
of literature that relate to our analysis:  the literature on trade credit, the literature on the 
financial crisis and SME finance, and the intersection of these two literatures.  In Section 
III we describe our data and our methodology.  In Section IV we present our results. 
Section V concludes. 
 
II.  Related Research 
II.A.  The Potential Advantages of Trade Credit 
A considerable body of research has been devoted in recent decades to analysing 
the role of trade credit in providing firms with external finance.  There is some evidence 
to indicate that trade creditors might even have an advantage over other lenders 
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(specifically, banks) in providing credit to especially opaque firms.  Among these 
arguments is the possibility that suppliers may act as “relationship lenders” because they 
have unique proprietary information about their customers (McMillan and Woodruff, 
1999; Uchida et al., 2013). Some papers find that suppliers can obtain information about 
customer quality that is unavailable to banks (Smith 1987, Biais and Gollier 1997).  One 
paper shows that trade suppliers may have an advantage in enforcing unsecured debt 
contracts (Cuñat 2007). This advantage allows suppliers to extend more credit than banks 
when their customers are rationed in the bank loan market.  Another paper has shown that 
smaller suppliers extend more trade credit to larger creditworthy borrowers as a 
mechanism to signal product quality (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan 2011). 
Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) also emphasize that information about a 
firm’s customers is potentially valuable and that sellers act on this information to extend 
credit on terms that are not available from banks. Some have suggested that this supplier 
information advantage in funding opaque firms may imply a complementarity between 
trade credit and bank loans (Cook, 1999; Ono, 2001; García-Appendini, 2006). However, 
this argument is not necessarily inconsistent with the view that bank loans are a less 
expensive substitute for trade credit (e.g., Meltzer, 1960; Brechling and Lipsey, 1963; 
Ramey, 1992; Marotta, 1996; Uesugi and Yamashiro 2004; Tsuruta, 2008).  It has been 
suggested that both views (substitutes and complements) can be reconciled by 
conditioning on whether firms are financially constrained or not (García Appendini, 
2006). 3  
 
                                                        
3 See Giannetti et al. (2011) and Uchida and Udell (2012) for comprehensive reviews of this now extensive 
literature. 
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II.B.  The Literature on SME Credit Access During the Current Financial Crisis 
The literature on the impact of the current crisis on access to credit is now 
growing at a rapid rate as the passage of time makes more data available to the research 
community.  Some of the earliest studies focused on the U.S. and found evidence of 
significant supply shocks to the terms and availability of credit to larger firms (e.g., de 
Haas and van Horen 2010, Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010, Almeida et al. 2012).  As we 
noted above, however, the U.S. has not been a good venue to study the impact of the 
crisis on credit access by SMEs.  Consequently, much of the research on how more 
informationally opaque firms were affected by the contraction of credit has been focused 
elsewhere, particularly Europe where SME data is more available.   
A key challenge in this literature is sorting out demand and supply effects.4  
Papers that have looked at credit crunch effects at the firm level have taken several 
different approaches.  One approach has been to use loan application data to control for 
demand (e.g., Puri et al. 2011, Popov and Udell 2012, Ongena et al. 2013, Presbitero et al. 
2014).  Another approach has been to use firm fixed effects in countries where multiple 
banking relationships are common in the SME sector (e.g., Albertazzi and Marchetti 2010, 
Iyer et al. 2010, Jimenez, et al. 2012).  Overall the literature suggests that the credit 
crunch in the SME sector was economically significant, that weaker banks (measured in a 
variety of different ways) contracted their credit more, and some -- but not all found -- 
that weaker and more opaque firms were more adversely affected.5 
 
                                                        
4 Occasionally natural experiments occur where supply shocks are necessarily insulated from demand 
shocks as in the case of Japanese subsidiaries in California during the Japanese financial crisis (i.e., Peek 
and Rosengren 1997).  This, however, does not apply in this crisis. 
5 See Presbitero, Udell and Zazzaro (2013) and Popov and Udell (2012) for recent summaries of the 
literature on SME access to finance and the current financial crisis. 
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II.C.  The Intersection of the Crisis, Real Effects and Trade Credit 
In order to fully assess the impact of the credit crunch on the SME sector all 
sources of external finance must be considered.  One type of lending might substitute for 
another type of lending; and, one type of lender might substitute for another type of 
lender (Taketa and Udell 2007, Udell 2009).  In this paper we study the most important 
alternative to bank lending in the SME sector, trade credit.   
As we noted above some papers have analyzed whether trade credit and bank 
loans are substitutes or complements.  We ask a more specific question in this paper: Did 
SMEs crunched out of the bank loan market turn to trade credit as an alternative source of 
finance for their capital expenditures during the crisis?  There are three papers on trade 
credit and financial crisis that are related to our analysis.  One of these papers – the first 
chronologically - found that larger firms in the U.S. used their access to the commercial 
paper market to fund an increased extension of trade credit during monetary policy 
shocks (Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel 1995).  The second paper looked at the 
Japanese financial crisis of the 1990s (the “lost decade”) – a crisis that in many ways 
mirrored the current U.S. financial crisis.  This paper found little evidence that trade 
credit played much of a role as a lender of last resort in Japan (Taketa and Udell 2007).  
The lack of firm level data in this study, however, limited its ability to draw distinctions 
among firms with respect to their use of trade credit. 
The third study, G-M, is the closest to ours because it used firm-level U.S. data to 
look at trade credit flows during this crisis.  G-M found evidence that firms with large 
levels of pre-crisis liquidity extended more trade credit during the crisis.  It also found 
that financially constrained firms utilized (received) more trade credit.  This study, 
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however, was limited to large firms with a market capitalization of $50 million or more or 
a book value of $10 million or more.  (As we noted above, data limitations in the U.S. -  
like Japan during the “lost decade” - preclude firm-level analyses of SMEs.)6  At first 
blush, it might seem reasonable to speculate that this finding on trade credit for large 
firms would also apply to SMEs based on the argument that if an effect is found for 
inherently more transparent (i.e., large) firms with access to the capital markets, it likely 
applies to firms that are less transparent (SMEs).  But, some caution must be exercised in 
extrapolating this result on large U.S. firms to U.S. SMEs for several reasons.  First, the 
magnitude of the effect might be quite different between large and small firms.  Second, 
the financial crisis in the U.S. hit large banks first.  Small banks who lend exclusively to 
SMEs were hit later and hit by different factors, most importantly commercial real estate.   
Finally, the G-M study can’t tell us whether larger “liquidity unconstrained firms” were 
as willing to extend increased trade credit to smaller SMEs as they were to other large 
firms (who were likely bigger customers). 
Thus, our paper is quite distinct from G-M (i.e., the only other paper to study 
trade credit during the financial crisis) in that we specifically analyze SMEs, not large 
firms.  Moreover, our focus is quite different: instead of emphasizing how trade credit 
flows from liquid firms to constrained firms, we focus on the sensitivity of investment to 
trade credit and bank credit.  That is, while in G-M the dependent variables are accounts 
receivable/payable, our main dependent variable is capital expenditures.  This connects 
our paper to an important recent stream of literature that examines the real effects of the 
crisis on the economy.  This literature includes, in particular, papers that have examined 
                                                        
6 This study used Compustat data and the authors also effectively eliminated mid-sized firms with their size 
filter because of concerns about the quality of the accounting data for these firms. 
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how corporate liquidity affected corporate investment during the crisis (e.g., Campello et 
al. 2010 and Duchin et al. 2010) and more generally the interaction among financial 
distress, corporate liquidity and asset allocation (Almeida et al. 2012).  We add a new 
dimension to this research on the real effects of the crisis by focusing on SMEs, arguably 
the most vulnerable sector of the economy and the sector for which there is a virtual 
absence of data in the U.S.      
We also differ significantly from G-M in terms of methodology.  In particular, we 
employ a very different approach to the proxies used in the G-M study to measure 
whether firms are financially constrained.  The three proxies used in G-M are the Kaplan-
Zingales (1997) index, the Whited-Wu (2006) index, and the dividend payout measure.  
These measures are calibrated for large firms that pay dividends and have access to the 
capital markets (i.e., large firms that have access to debt sources beyond bank loans 
including the private placement market, the commercial paper market, the medium-term 
note market and the corporate bond market.  These indexes are not appropriate for the 
SME market.  In Spain, like many other countries, the only two meaningful sources of 
external finance for SMEs are bank loans and trade credit.7  So, we specifically model 
firms that are bank constrained, the relevant benchmark in an SME context.  Also, our 
focus on the SME sector is particularly relevant in a European context where most firms 
and most employment reside in this sector.8,9 
                                                        
7 In the U.S. commercial finance companies also provide a significant of SME finance (e.g., Berger and 
Udell 1998). 
8 This is not to say that the SME sector is unimportant in the U.S. where the SME sector is probably at least 
40-45% of GDP depending on how one defines an SME. 
9 There are two recent papers that have studied investment sensitivity in a Kaplan-Zingales framework 
during this financial crisis. However, neither of these papers examine trade credit or demand factors 
potentially affecting access to funding by firms. The first paper, Duchin et al. (2010), analyzes a sample of 
U.S. firms during 2003 to 2009 and find that the negative supply shocks on firm investment during the 
crisis are larger for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short-term debt, ,or operate in industries 
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III.  Data and Methodology 
III.A. Empirical Strategy and Data 
Our empirical strategy involves two main steps. First, we identify firms that are 
financially constrained.  This has been a significant challenge in analyzing SME access to 
finance and the impact of macro shocks including the current credit crunch.  The chief 
problem is disentangling supply effects from demand effects.  Occasionally natural 
experiments present themselves that, in a sense, opportunistically solve the problem.  For 
example, Peek and Rosengren (1997) investigated how the collapse of the real estate 
market in Japan affected the provision of credit by Japanese bank subsidiaries abroad.  
Unfortunately these types of natural experiments are rare.  Another approach is to exploit 
firm-level survey data to separate demand and supply where respondents report whether 
they applied for credit, whether they were discouraged from applying for credit, and 
whether they received the credit they asked for (e.g., Popov and Udell 2012, Presbitero et 
al. 2014).  This approach has the virtue of a strong identification strategy but these 
surveys generally have only limited information on the financial characteristics of the 
borrower.  Another approach involves using loan application data from credit registries 
that have both firm-level financial statement information and application information 
                                                                                                                                                                     
dependent on external finance.  In the second of these papers dealing with firm investment during the crisis, 
Almeida et al. (2012) analyze the relationship between firm investment and debt maturity at U.S. 
companies. They find that firms whose long-term debt was largely maturing right after the third quarter of 
2007 cut their investment-to-capital ratio more than otherwise similar firms whose debt was scheduled to 
mature after 2008. 
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(e.g., Jimenez et al. 2012).  However, these data do not fully account for demand effects 
because they lack information on discouraged borrowers.10  
We adopt a different identification approach that avoids the data limitations that 
stem from a lack of information on firm financial conditions inherent in current survey 
data and the data limitations on demand effects inherent in credit registries that only 
observe actual applications.  Our approach involves estimating credit demand and supply 
from panel data on firm financial statements.  Specifically, we estimate the probability 
that a firm will experience borrowing constraints using a disequilibrium model (Maddala 
1980) that allows us to identify the set of (information-based and other) supply and 
demand factors that may affect the wedge between the costs of internal and external 
funding. This permits us to classify firms as constrained or unconstrained using both 
cross-section and times series information.   
In the second step, in order to assess the relative dependence on bank loans versus 
trade credit, we conduct an analysis of the effect of these two sources of external funding 
on investment using Granger predictability tests.  That is, we test whether i) investment 
for unconstrained firms is sensitive to (i.e., caused by) bank loans; and ii) investment for 
constrained firms is sensitive to (i.e., caused by) trade credit. In some sense this can be 
viewed as looking at the “dual” of the cash flow-investment sensitivity approach where 
the sources of investment funding are either banks loans or trade credit.  
Our data come from four sources. Two of the sources contain data for the SMEs 
that we analyse. The first of these is the Bureau-Van-Dijk Amadeus database which 
                                                        
10 In a similar fashion Puri et al. (2011) investigated consumer and mortgage lending by savings banks in 
Germany using data from the savings bank association and banks’ loan-level ratings.  But, likewise, these 
data don’t captured discouraged-borrower effect.  
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contains firm characteristics including financial information11. The second source of data 
is the SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos), another database by Bureau Van 
Dijk which overlaps with Amadeus but in addition contains the name of the bank(s) with 
whom the firm has a relationship, including, importantly for our purposes, lending 
relationships12. The third data source is the public financial information on Spanish banks 
provided by the two main banking associations (Spanish Commercial Bank Association, 
AEB, and Spanish Savings Banks Confederation, CECA). Finally, the fourth data source 
is the macroeconomic information provided by the INE (the Spanish Statistics Office).  
Our dataset allows us to combine SME information with regional-level 
macroeconomic, bank market industry variables (i.e., local market power) and 
relationship lending characteristics. This is critical in using our disequilibrium model to 
classify firms as either constrained our unconstrained.  
Our final sample covers 38,329 firms over the period 1994-2010, which 
represents around 5% of total firms in Spain on average over the sample period. Due to 
entry and exit of the firms, the panel is unbalanced and the number of firm-year 
observations is 528,31713 Our sample period spans a pre-crisis period from 1994-2006 
and a crisis period from 2007-2010.  Definitions of our variables and simple correlations 
are provided in the appendix. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table I including our 
main variable of interest, "capital expenditure/capital".  While its mean over the sample 
period is .33, it varies in interesting ways related to the crisis.  Figure 1 shows that it 
                                                        
11 We follow the European Commission and define SMEs as those firms with less than 250 employees. 
12 The information on bank-firm relationships is updated every year in the SABI dataset.   
13 .For the small number of medium-sized enterprises that are owned by a holding company, we use the 
consolidated financial statements.   
15 
 
increases from about .3 in 2001 to about .4 in 2007 and then significantly declines over 
the crisis years to about zero in 2009 and 2010.   
 
III.B. Identification of Financially Constrained Firms 
 
 The disequilibrium model that we employ to identify whether firms are 
financially constrained consists of two-reduced form equations: a demand equation for 
bank loans, and a supply equation that reflects the maximum amount of loans that banks 
are willing to lend. A third transactions equation restricts the value of loans as a min 
equation of desired demand and loan supply. From an econometric point of view, the 
main challenge associated with estimating the model is that one has to obtain estimators 
for the parameters of the loan supply and demand functions using only the observed 
volume of transactions in the loan market. We use the max likelihood method in Maddala 
and Nelson (1974) and Maddala (1980) to estimate the model. These models have been 
used before to analyze credit markets in different countries (see e.g. Sealey 1979; Perez 
1998, Ogawa and Suzuki 2000; Atanasova and Wilson 2004; Steijvers 2008 or Carbó et 
al. 2009).14  
Our loan demand (  ditBank loans ), loan supply (  
s
itBank loans ), and transactions 
equations (  itBank loans ) for firm i in period t are: 
0 1 2
3 4
d d d d
it it it
d d d
it it
Bank  loans Sales Cash flow
Loan interest spread GDP growth u
  
 
  
         (1) 
0 1 2
3 4
s d s s
it it
s s s
it it
Bank  loans Tangible assets Bank  market  power
Default  risk GDP growth u
  
 
  
                             (2)
 
                                                        
14 We are assuming here that trade credit is more expensive than bank loans.  Thus, we can focus on bank 
loans to determine whether firms are constrained in their access to external finance. 
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 (  ,  )d sit it itBank loans Min Bank loans Bank loans                                                   (3) 
 The identification problem is solved in the disequilibrium model by attributing the 
observed changes in the quantity of loans to underlying movements in the loan demand 
and loan supply functions.  
Our bank loan demand equation (1) is modelled as a function of firm activity 
(Sales), internal financing (Cash flow), and the firm’s interest spread on its bank loans 
(Loan interest spread).  The latter is computed as the difference between the loan interest 
rate and the interbank interest rate15. The Sales variable is included to capture demand for 
bank loans to finance firm assets including accounts receivables, inventory and fixed 
assets.  Cash flow controls for internal funds that may be used in lieu of external bank 
financing. The interest rate spread captures the cost of such financing. The maximum 
amount of credit available to a firm (i.e., the supply of credit) is modelled as a function of 
the firm’s collateralizable assets (Tangible assets), the banks’ local market power 
measured by the Lerner index (Banks’ market power),16 and a proxy for firm default risk 
(Default risk) which is defined as the ratio of operating profits over interest paid. 
Tangible assets controls for the likelihood that, other things equal, banks will be willing 
to lend more to firms with more collateral. The Banks’ market power indicator captures 
the extent to which bank competition may alter the supply curve. Default risk measures 
the extent to which a firm’s risk profile may affect the supply of bank loans (with a 
coverage ratio commonly used by bankers to assess credit quality). 
                                                        
15 In the absence of specific data on a firm’s loan interest rate we proxy this rate with the ratio of interest 
expense to bank loans outstanding.  We implicitly assume that the year-end loan balance is roughly equal to 
the weighted average balance during the year.   
16 See Cetorelli and Gambera (2001). The Lerner index is defined as the ratio “(price of total assets - 
marginal costs of total assets)/(price of total assets)”. The price of total assets is directly computed from 
bank-level auxiliary data as the average ratio of “bank revenue/total assets” for the banks operating in a 
given region using the distribution of branches of banks in the different regions as the weighting factor. 
Marginal costs are also estimated from the auxiliary sample.  
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All non-ratio variables are converted into ratios (of total assets) to reduce 
heteroscedasticity. As a consequence, the size (scale) effect of “total assets” in the 
demand function above is estimated as part of the constant term since the constant term is 
estimated as a coefficient of the reciprocal of total assets. Both the demand and supply 
equations contain GDP growth to control for macroeconomic conditions across the 
regional markets where the SMEs operate.  Equations (1) – (3) represent our baseline 
model. 
 We also consider alternative specifications.  It could be argued, for example, that 
Sales and Cash flow could also enter the demand equation.  Cash flow could affect loan 
supply through its importance in covenants such as those on coverage ratios (Sufi 2009).  
Similarly, it could be argued that Tangible Assets might also enter the demand equation 
because these assets need to be financed and Default Risk might also enter the demand 
equation as this may proxy the growth opportunities.  
 The strength of the bank-borrower relationship might also be a determinant of 
loan supply for banks (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 Berger and Udell 1995). The SABI 
database allows us to proxy relationship strength in the supply equation with three 
different variables: the age of the firm, the length of the relationship measured as the 
length in years of the relationship between the firm and its main bank (we assume the 
main bank is either the only bank working with the firm or the bank with the longest 
relationship), and a dummy variable showing whether the firm has a single (0) or 
multiple (1) bank relationships. 
 Our first alternative model, following the discussion above adds Tangible assets 
and Default risk to the demand equation and Sales and Cash-flow to the supply equation. 
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A third model adds the relationship lending variables (Age of the firm, Number of years of 
the relationship, and Single vs. multiple bank relationships) to the supply equation. 
Finally, a fourth model adds two more variables that might also affect loan supply during 
the sample period, a House price index capturing the value of collateral and the growth of 
the market (Growth in the number of firms) as a proxy for the number of potential lending 
opportunities for banks. 
We employ firm, industry and bank fixed effects to account for unobservable 
firm-level, industry-level and bank-level influences.17 We address the potential 
endogeneity problem associated with, among other things, regressing a quantity on its 
price by using lagged values of the explanatory variables as instruments.  
Our simultaneous equations system shown in (1), (2) and (3) and the three 
alternative specifications, are estimated as a switching regression model using a full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) routine with fixed effects. Based on the results 
from the disequilibrium model, a firm is defined as financially constrained in year t if the 
probability that the desired amount of bank credit in year t exceeds the maximum amount 
of credit available in the same year is greater than 0.5. Following Gersovitz (1980), the 
probability that a firm will face a financial constraint in year t is expressed as: 
Pr( ) Pr( )
d d s s
d s d d d s s s it it
it it it it it it
X Xloan loan X u X u    
         
         (4)   
where ditX  and 
s
itX  denote the variables that determine a firm’s loan demand and the 
maximum amount of credit available to a firm, respectively. The error terms are assumed 
to be distributed normally, 2 var( )d sit itu u   , and  (.) is a standard normal distribution 
                                                        
17 Firms are categorized into 14 industries. 
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function. Since ( )d d dit itE loan X   and ( )s s sit itE loan X  , Pr( ) 0.5d sit itloan loan  , if and 
only if ( ) ( )d sit itE loan E loan .  This specification will also allow us to distinguish between 
those borrowers that get less in bank loans than they need (partially constrained) and 
those that don’t get any loans at all (fully constrained). 
 In order to make our identification strategy of unconstrained vs. constrained firms 
as accurate as possible we utilize two criteria: 
 - Firms are classified as "constrained" (or "unconstrained") only if they meet this 
classification standard in all four of the disequilibrium model specifications. The degree 
of coincidence here is 90% meaning that 90% of the cases the firms are classified the 
same in all four models (i.e., this reduces the sample size by 10%).  
 - Following Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) an 
accounting ratio filter is applied that excludes from the sample of constrained firms those 
that fall into all three of the following categories: the highest quartile of sales growth, the 
highest quartile of inventory growth, and the highest quartile of debt (external funding) to 
total assets. Although accounting ratios may be good proxies for financing constraints, 
they can be affected by endogeneity and identification problems. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that these problems are most acute for 
observations containing extreme values for these ratios.  So we exclude these firms in 
order to better capture firms that are truly “constrained”.18 We note, however, that this 
accounting filter only excludes about 1% of the total number of observations and that our 
results are not significantly different without their exclusion (i.e., without applying this 
                                                        
18 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) note, for example that “if both investment and cash flow grow at a rate 
similar to the growth rate of sales, then part of the comovement of investment and cash flow may be due to 
a scale factor. This effect would bias the estimates of the investment-cash flow sensitivity toward one, 
particularly in firms with higher annual growth rates.” Consequently, Kaplan and Zingales only report the 
results of regressions that exclude firm-years with more than 30 percent sales growth (the upper quartile).   
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filter). Likewise the inclusion or exclusion of these firms has no significant impact on the 
results from the second-stage regressions which test the sensitivity of investment to 
alternative sources of external funding19.  
 
 
III.C. Estimation of the Relative Dependence on Bank Loans versus Trade Credit  
 
Using the classifications from our disequilibrium model we can now turn to our 
predictability tests that analyze the sensitivity of investment to the two key sources of 
SME external finance, bank loans and trade credit. (Again, we only include the firms that 
passed the two criteria described above.) If constrained SMEs turn to trade credit as an 
alternative to bank loans, then we should find that trade credit predicts investment but 
bank loans do not.  However, for unconstrained firms who have access to bank loans we 
should find that bank loans predict investment but trade credit does not.  Since our dataset 
consists of cross-section and time series firm-level observations, the predictability 
regressions include fixed effects ( f ). The empirical specification follows the Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1988) approach on predictability tests for panel data. Given N firms 
(i=1,…,N), t time periods (t=1,…,T), and firm-specific fixed effects (fi), bank loans - 
specifically “bank loans/total liabilities” - will predict investment if two conditions are 
met:  
 
                                                        
19 Even if the results are similar when this criterion is applied, this filter serves as a good test for the 
potential impact of the so-called “flypaper effect” in our second-stage estimation. As shown by Hines and 
Thaler (1995), in the context of firm financing constraints, the flypaper effect refers to the possibility that 
some firms are conservative in their investment decision-making, and they invest only when they have the 
cash flow to do so. 
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i) the bank loans ratio is statistically significant in a time-series regression in first 
differences of firm investment:  
0
1
1
it it-1 t it it-1 t-1
m
j it it-1 t - j it it-1 t j
j
j it
( Capital exp enditure / capital )  -( Capital exp enditure / capital )   
 ( Capital  expenditure / capital ) (Capital  expenditure / capital )
+ ( Bank  loans / total  liabil



 


   
1
1
1
m
it t - j it it t j
j
t i it it
ities ) (Bank  loans / total  liabilities )  
f ( u u )
 


  
  
      (5)
        
ii) and, the investment variable is not significant when it is included in a time-series 
regression in first differences of the bank loans ratio:  
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l ) (Capital  expenditure / capital )  
f ( u u )
 


  
  
          (6)
                   
 If instead, the situation is reversed so that the i in the first set of regressions is 
not significant while in the second set i is significant, then investment predicts bank 
loans.  Further, if bank loans variable in equation (5) and the firm investment variable in 
equation (6) are both significant, then there will be predictability in both directions and it 
is likely that a third factor is driving both the evolution of firm investment and bank loans.  
The variables are lagged (with m being the number of lags) given that these 
relationships are not necessarily contemporary but likely reflect long-term effects 
(Rosseau and Wachtel 1998). An Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedure is applied 
as a test for unit roots. First differencing the variables was sufficient to achieve 
stationarity.  This is also important because the specification in (5) and (6) introduces a 
problem of simultaneity because the error term is correlated with the regressor. To 
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address this, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variables procedure with a 
time-varying set of instruments is used to estimate the model in first differences. As for 
the number of lags, the dependent variables are regressed on the two-year lagged 
explanatory variables. We also follow Holtz-Eakin et al. (1998) to determine the optimal 
lag length, which is given by the value of m that minimizes the sum of the squared 
residuals (m=2 in our case).  
The vector of instrumental variables used to identify the parameters of the 
equations in first differences includes two lags of sales growth, cash flow and the ratio of 
“tangible assetst/ total assetst-1” (to proxy for asset tangibility and creditworthiness). A 
necessary condition for identification is that there are at least as many instrumental 
variables as other right-hand side variables. The standard Hansen test for identification is 
employed.  
As control variables, the predictability equations include Interbank interest rates, 
Cash flowt/capitalt-1, Sales growth and the Trade credit defaults. The statistical 
significance of the predictability test is measured using an F-test.  The identification of 
the equation is improved when the individual effects and the lagged coefficients are 
stationary, so that the individual effects are eliminated.  Since the results of standard 
Augmented-Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that first-differencing is sufficient to achieve 
stationarity, all variables are expressed in first-differences.  
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IV.  Results 
IV.A. Disequilibrium model results  
The results of the four alternative specifications for the disequilibrium model 
estimated over the entire sample period are shown in Table II.  All of the key variables 
show the expected sign.  All of the specifications include bank and industry fixed effects. 
Taking the baseline model in column (1), sales over total assets and GDP growth are 
found to positively and significantly affect the demand for loans while the cash flow over 
total assets and the interest rate spread are negatively and significantly related to the 
demand for loans. Asset tangibility and GDP growth are found to be significant and 
positive determinants of loan supply while bank market power negatively affects the 
supply of loans to firms. As for the results in column (2) of Table II, they are very similar 
to the baseline specification but asset tangibility also enters the demand equation as a 
positive and significant explanatory factor and cash flow and sales are found to be (both 
positive and significant) determinants of loan supply. A set of relationship lending 
variables are included in column (3) and they are all found to be statistically significant 
determinants of loan supply. In particular, the age of the firm and the number of years of 
the bank-firm relationship are found to affect loan supply positively, while loan supply is 
lower for firms having multiple bank relationships as opposed to single relationships.  
Finally, the specification in column (4) adds the house price index and the growth of the 
number of firms and they are also found to affect loan supply positively and significantly.  
Importantly, the estimated coefficients of the variables that are used in all the 
specifications do not vary significantly across them. The coincidence in the firms which 
are estimated to be constrained across the four specifications is 90%. 
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We alternatively allow the coefficients to vary across three periods to reflect the 
possibility that our supply and demand functions change (not shown for simplicity).  The 
first period, 1994-2000, covers the recovery years after the credit crunch of the early 
1990s; the second period, 1994-2006, captures the expansion years and the credit boom 
of the pre-crisis regime; and the third period, 2007-2010, captures the financial crisis.  We 
use the most complete model in Table II - the one shown in column (4) - as a reference 
for the estimations across three periods. The coefficients appear particularly large for 
cash flow, loan interest spread and asset tangibility during the crisis period, showing the 
importance of these factors as determinants of loan demand and supply during periods of 
financial instability.   
In order to verify that our empirical estimations of the disequilibrium model are 
reasonable we examine whether they show an increase in the fraction of firms that are 
constrained during the crisis (Table III) and whether constrained firms behave as we 
might have expected relative to unconstrained firms (Table IV).  Table III shows in a 
year-by-year analysis that indeed the fraction of constrained firms increased during the 
crisis (2007-2010) based on the results column 4 of Table II and the additional filters of 
the quartile analysis described above.  This result holds for alternative definitions of 
“constrained” including, partially constrained firms (those that received less in bank loans 
than they wanted) and fully constrained firms (those with a positive demand who 
received no bank loans).  This is consistent with the general conclusion in the literature 
that SMEs faced a credit crunch during the current financial crisis (e.g., Jimenez et al. 
2012, Popov and Udell 2011, and Puri, Rocholl and Steffen 2011).  Unlike the current 
literature on the credit crunch in the SME market, we use on our European data a 
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different methodology to separate demand from supply effects, i.e., we do not depend on 
survey questions or other data on whether firms applied for credit, nor do we depend on 
firm fixed effects for firms that borrow from multiple banks (which may or may not be 
analogous to single-bank firms).  Our approach involves estimating demand and supply 
effects separately for each firm. Table IV shows that our key variables do indeed reflect 
differences between constrained and unconstrained firms as we would expect.  In 
particular, capital expenditure and cash flow are stronger for unconstrained firms and 
cash flow-investment sensitivity is lower for unconstrained firms. 
 
   [INSERT TABLE IV HERE] 
 
IV.B. Firm financing and investment predictability tests: baseline results  
Now we turn to our main analysis - our tests on trade credit and financial 
constraints. These tests, shown in Table V, distinguish between unconstrained firms 
(Panel A), partially-constrained firms (Panel B) and fully-constrained firms (Panel C). A 
dummy variable distinguishing the pre-crisis (1994-2006) and crisis (2007-2010) periods 
is interacted with our investment (capital expenditure/capital) and bank funding (bank 
loans/total liabilities) variables. Again, the observations that did not pass the filters 
mentioned at the end of Section III.B were dropped out of the sample in all of our 
analyses. The results are shown without any crisis dummy or interaction (columns 1 to 4 
in Table V), with the crisis dummy (columns 5 to 8) and with the crisis dummy and the 
interaction terms (columns 9 to 12). We note that the values from the Hansen test for 
over-identifying restrictions indicate that the instruments that we use are valid. 
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For unconstrained firms in Panel A, we find that bank loans predict capital 
expenditure but capital expenditure is not found to be a significant determinant of bank 
loans. The coefficient is 0.51 suggesting that a 1% increase in the ratio of loans/total 
liabilities increases investment (capital expenditure/capital) by 0.51%. This implies, for 
example, that a one standard deviation "bank loans/total liabilities" (i.e., 0.15) will 
produce a 7.65% change in investment. We also find that for unconstrained firms there is 
no significant change in the relationship between loans and investment from the pre-crisis 
to the crisis period as the dummy variable is not found to be statistically significant.  
Finally, trade credit (accounts payable/total liabilities) is not found to explain investment 
in unconstrained firms. 
For partially-constrained firms (Panel B of Table V), "accounts payable/total 
liabilities" affects investment while "loans/total liabilities" do not. In particular, the 
coefficient of "accounts payable/total liabilities" is 0.19 suggests that one standard 
deviation in this variable (0.17) will increase investment by 3.23%. Interestingly, there is 
no significant change in the relationship between trade credit and investment from the 
pre-crisis to the crisis years. 
For fully-constrained firms (Panel C of Table V), only the relationship between 
accounts payable and capital expenditure can be analysed because, by definition, fully 
constrained firms do not get any bank loans. The results here show that "accounts 
payable/total liabilities" predicts investment and the coefficient (0.24) is even larger than 
for partially-constrained firms. Interestingly, the pre-crisis vs. crisis dummy shows a 
positive and significant sign in the case of fully-constrained firms which suggests that the 
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dependence on trade credit for investment is even more important for constrained firms 
during crisis years.  
 
[INSERT TABLE V HERE] 
 
IV.C. Firm financing and investment predictability tests: breakdown for different 
time periods 
 In order to further explore the changes in the relationship between external firm 
funding and investment during the crisis years, we split the estimations for the two 
periods (1994-2006 and 2007-2010)20  This allows us to check whether the findings 
relationships in Table V hold for the periods before and during the crisis and whether they 
change in magnitude. The results are not shown for simplicity but the main findings are 
as follows: "Bank loans/total liabilities" predict investment at unconstrained firms both 
before and during the crisis.  However, during the crisis, sensitivity of investment to bank 
loans decreased for unconstrained firms (but is still significant at the 10% level). This is 
consistent with the effects of the credit crunch. This result also appears for partially 
constrained firms. This is consistent with the effects of a credit crunch. This also holds 
for partially constrained firms (i.e., decreased sensitivity but still significant at the 10% 
level). The results from the pre-crisis to the crisis years for fully-constrained firms 
suggest that the relationship between "accounts payable/total liabilities" and investment 
shown in Table V is even larger during the crisis years (0.27) than during the pre-crisis 
                                                        
20 We have also estimated the main equations for the earlier post-crunch  period (1994-2000).  The results 
are similar to the pre-crunch period of 1994-2006 although the coefficients showing loan-investment and 
trade-credit investment sensitivities are of a lesser magnitude. For the sake of simplicity we only report the 
results for the 1994-2006 and 2007-2008 periods. The results of the 1994-2000 period are available upon 
request to the authors.  
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years (0.22). This suggests a particularly important role for trade credit in financing 
investment for firms who do not have access to bank loans during times of financial 
stress. 
As an additional robustness check we use an alternative measure of trade credit 
financing substituting the number of days that trade credit is extended to firms for 
“accounts payable/total liabilities”. The results are very similar.  
As a final robustness check, the predictability tests were also estimated (not 
shown) excluding those firms showing a cash-flow investment correlation higher than 
90% since these firms may be particularly conservative in their investment decision-
making investing only when they have the cash flow to do so (Hines and Thaler, 1995). 
Our main findings hold when these firms are excluded. 
Taken together our results provide the strongest results yet in the literature that 
trade credit provides the most important alternative lending technology to bank loans for 
credit constrained SMEs and that trade credit plays an especially vital role during a credit 
crisis.  Unlike prior studies that were confined to analyzing the behaviour of trade credit 
during macro shocks either from a large firm perspective (e.g., Calomiris, Himmelberg 
and Wachtel et al. 1995, Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga 2013) or confined to 
analyzing aggregated SME data (Taketa and Udell 2007), we are able to analyze the role 
of trade credit using firm-level data. Although our results do not permit us to establish if 
bank loans and trade credit are substitutes or complements for firm financing, we find 
that unconstrained firms depend more on bank financing to fund capital expenditure 
while constrained firms depend more on trade credit, and that the magnitude of these 
effects increases during the crisis for fully-constrained firms. 
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V.  Conclusions 
There is a growing literature on the effect of the financial crisis on firm access to 
finance.  Virtually all of the literature on the most vulnerable firms, SMEs, has been 
conducted in Europe because of a lack of firm-level data on SMEs in the U.S.  Unlike 
large firms, SMEs do not have access to the capital markets and thus have a much more 
limited menu of alternative sources of external finance.  Despite this vulnerability, there 
has been virtually no research on how SMEs changed their dependence on alternative 
sources of external finance during the financial crisis.  Practically speaking there are only 
two economically important alternatives for SMEs across most of the world:  bank loans 
and trade credit. 
In this paper we analyse whether trade credit provided an alternative source of 
external finance to SMEs during the current crisis using firm level panel data on over 
40,000 Spanish SMEs.  Like other recent studies using European SME data we find 
significant evidence of a general credit crisis in the SME sector during the crisis.  But, for 
the first time, we also find that SME access to these two alternative sources of external 
finance varies across firms and that it changed during the crisis in interesting ways.  
Specifically, we find that credit constrained SMEs depend on trade credit, but not bank 
loans, to finance capital expenditure -- and that the intensity of this dependence increased 
during the financial crisis.  Unconstrained firms, in contrast, are dependent on banks 
loans but not trade credit.  This suggests that trade credit was an important mechanism 
that helped some SMEs cope with the credit crisis induced by this crisis. In other words, 
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we find evidence that trade creditors play a role in the SME sector as lenders of last resort 
and this role becomes more important during a credit crisis. 
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TABLE I. VARIABLES: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The descriptive statistics in this table refer to the sample selection effectively used in the empirical 
analysis after applying the appropriate filters, as described in section III.B. 
 
VARIABLE Mean St Dev. Median Max Min 25% 75% 
Capital expendituret / capitalt-1 0.33 0.18 0.31 0.73 0.00 0.19 0.51 
Bank loans 5,632.4 4,987.2 5,139.7 19,263.5 0.00 639,6 12,386.2 
Banks loans/total liabilities 0.21 0.15 0.19 0.75 0.00 0.08 0.49 
Credit period 27.11 17.18 26.52 89.18 10.04 14.16 65.99 
Accounts payable / total liabilities 0.31 0.17 0.28 0.59 0.00 0.16 0.48 
Total assets 9,694.2 3,958.3 7,153.26 839,156.1 1,116.3 3,277.1 759,215.3 
Tangible assets 1,513.7 639.28 1,386.4 116,209.3 31.23 753.4 1.380.2 
Cash flow 1,253.8 436.30 1,196.9 10,596.3 10,36 435.0 7,326.1 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1 0.42 0.28 0.36 0.63 0.04 0.16 0.53 
Sales 18,630..3 10,041.5 16,215.6 2,326,255.4 231.23 6,153.3 1,154,005.2 
Sales growth 0.23 0.14 0.21 1.23 0.02 0.15 0.89 
Interbank interest rates 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.06 
Loan interest spread 0.01 0.003 0.01 0.07 0.001 0.007 0.05 
Default risk 4.29 2.16 4.15 10.33 0.86 3.31 8.74 
Banks ’market power 23.02 8.56 22.17 39.77 16.25 19.23 31.13 
House price index 8.96 3.34 8.45 21.32 -8.9 5.61 19.05 
Market growth (growth of the number of 
firms) 6.79 2.31 6.36 15.31 2.42 4.27 12.11 
Defaults in trade credit 0.02 0.002 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.012 0.073 
GDP growth 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.015 0.043 
Age of the firm  10.71 3.74 10.47 62.7 0 4.17 38.26 
Length (n. years relationship) 6.54 2.58 6.22 24.3 0 2.93 17.32 
Single vs. multiple bank relationships  0.50 0.22 0.48 5 0 0.02 3.75 
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TABLE II. ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
Switching regression model estimated by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) with firm fixed effects 
p-values in parenthesis 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
 
Demand for bank loans (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Sales/total assets(t-1) 0.6032*** (0.000) 
0.5918*** 
(0.000) 
0.6116*** 
(0.000) 
0.6193*** 
(0.000) 
Cash-flow/total assets(t-1) -2.0832*** (0.000) 
-2.1365*** 
(0.000) 
-2.0483*** 
(0.000) 
-2.0613*** 
(0.000) 
Loan interest spread -1.4021*** (0.000) 
-1.3716*** 
(0.000) 
-1.3813** 
(0.000) 
-1.3918*** 
(0.000) 
GDP growth 0.0230** (0.011) 
0.0211** 
(0.015) 
0.0219** 
(0.010) 
0.0215** 
(0.012) 
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1) - 0.0374* (0.069) 
0.0386* 
(0.053) 
0.0374* 
(0.057) 
Default risk - 0.00025 (0.394) 
0.00029 
(0.325) 
0.00024 
(0.349) 
     
Supply of bank loans     
Tangible fixed assets/total assets(t-1) 2.4238*** (0.000) 
2.4238*** 
(0.000) 
2.4238*** 
(0.000) 
2.3460*** 
(0.000) 
Banks’ market power -0.9704*** (0.006) 
-0.9704*** 
(0.006) 
-0.9704*** 
(0.006) 
-0.9521*** 
(0.006) 
Default risk 0.000027 (0.759) 
0.000027 
(0.759) 
0.000029 
(0.759) 
0.000031 
(0.704) 
GDP growth 0.0799** (0.013) 
0.0799** 
(0.013) 
0.0799** 
(0.013) 
0.0816** 
(0.017) 
Cash-flow/total assets(t-1) - 0.9753** (0.26) 
0.9426** 
(0.029) 
0.9701** 
(0.024) 
Sales/total assets(t-1) - 0.4906** (0.019) 
0.5113** 
(0.023) 
0.4896** 
(0.020) 
Age of the firm - - 0.2913** (0.016) 
0.2841** 
(0.019) 
N. years relationship - - 0.1304*** (0.009) 
0.1283** 
(0.013) 
Single vs. multiple bank relationships - - -0.0392* (0.057) 
-0.0355* 
(0.051) 
House price index - - - 0.0372* (0.076) 
Market growth (growth of the number of firms) - - - 0.0026** (0.041) 
     
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan demand equation 349,328.2*** (0.000) 
364,231.4*** 
(0.000) 
349,328.2*** 
(0.000) 
356,288.6*** 
(0.000) 
Reciprocal of total assets in the loan supply equation 225,361.4*** (0.000) 
229,183.0*** 
(0.000) 
225,361.4*** 
(0.000) 
230,291.4*** 
(0.000) 
S.D. of demand equation 1.5732*** (0.000) 
1.6233*** 
(0.000) 
1.5732*** 
(0.000) 
1.5327*** 
(0.000) 
S.D. of supply equation 0.4628*** (0.000) 
0.4427*** 
(0.000) 
0.4628*** 
(0.000) 
0.4840*** 
(0.000) 
Correlation coefficient 0.7016*** (0.000) 
0.7123*** 
(0.000) 
0.7016*** 
(0.000) 
0.6552*** 
(0.000) 
Log likelihood 157,329 163,188 157,329 159,727 
Observations 528.317 528.317 528.317 528.317 
Number of firms 38.329 38.329 38.329 38.329 
* Statistically significant at 10% level 
** Statistically significant at 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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TABLE III. PERCENTAGE OF BORROWING CONSTRAINED FIRMS 
This table is based on the classification of firms that fall into each one of the categories in all the four specifications of 
the disequilibrium model in Table II. Additionally, using fully exogenous classifications such as those from Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) or  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) –which are based on accounting ratios- we have excluded from the 
sample of constrained firms those that fall in the highest quartile of sales growth, the highest inventory growth, and the 
highest quartile of debt (external funding) to total assets. Fully-constrained firms are those that do not receive any 
lending but having a positive demand. Partially-constrained firms are those getting less credit that desired. Distressed 
firms are firms that go bankrupt in a given year.  
 
 Fully-constrained 
Partially-
constrained 
Constrained 
(fully plus 
partially 
constrained) 
% Constrained 
firms among those 
always active over 
the sample period 
% Distressed 
firms 
Entire period 
(1994-2010) 5.88 28.15 34.03 30.88 7.29 
1994 8.16 27.13 35.29 30.04 8.04 
1995 7.31 24.99 32.3 29.36 7.71 
1996 6.03 29.03 35.06 29.54 7.80 
1997 6.15 27.12 33.27 28.16 7.01 
1998 5.07 29.75 34.82 28.17 6.69 
1999 4.94 29.93 34.87 27.77 6.20 
2000 4.52 30.37 34.89 26.90 6.75 
2001 4.02 29.98 34,00 26.85 6.88 
2002 3.88 29.8 33.68 26.71 6.73 
2003 3.64 29.64 33.28 26.29 6.42 
2004 3.6 29.4 33,00 26.04 6.05 
2005 3.75 29.71 33.46 26.33 6.31 
2006 3.7 28.89 32.59 25.84 5.91 
2007 4.36 34.02 38.38 29.99 7.23 
2008 6.28 35.94 42.22 31.85 7.95 
2009 8.85 42.15 51,00 38.31 12.33 
2010 12.31 48.32 60.63 46.15 14.31 
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TABLE IV.  COMPARISON OF FIRMS BY FINANCING CONSTRAINT STATUS 
     
 Fully-constrained 
Partially- 
constrained Unconstrained 
All 
firms 
Mean 
differences 
between 
fully-and 
partially 
constrained 
(p-value) 
Mean 
differences 
between 
fully-
constrained 
and 
unconstraine
d (p-value) 
Mean 
differences 
between 
partially-
constrained 
and 
unconstrained 
(p-value) 
% over all firms 5.88 28.15 65.97 100 - - - 
Capital expendituret/ 
capitalt-1 
0.161 0.173 0.415 0.334 0.327 0.004 0.005 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1 0.118 0.240 0.334 0.308 0.032 0.003 0.025 
(Cash flowt –Capital 
expendituret)/ capitalt-1 
-0.079 -0.064 0.118 0.061 0.087 0.013 0.016 
Sales growth 0.081 0.220 0.561 0.473 0.013 0.001 0.010 
Inventory growth -0.037 0.050 0.213 0.0131 0.008 0.002 0.005 
Cash flow-investment 
correlation 0.578 0.739 0.459 0.714 0.045 0.046 0.017 
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TABLE V.  FIRM FINANCING AND INVESTMENT PREDICTABILITY TESTS.  
2SLS with instrumental variables (p-values in parentheses) and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
        PANEL A. UNCONSTRAINED FIRMS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Bank 
loans/total 
liabilities 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Accounts 
payable/ 
total 
liabilities 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Bank 
loans/total 
liabilities 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Accounts 
payable/ 
total 
liabilities 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Bank 
loans/total 
liabilities 
Capital 
expendituret/ 
capitalt-1 
Accounts 
payable/ 
total 
liabilities 
Constant 0.2957* (0.114) 
0.1705* 
(0.081) 
0.3205 
(0.119) 
0.1462* 
(0.071) 
0.3086* 
(0.126) 
0.1682* 
(0.080) 
0.3105 
(0.117) 
0.1326* 
(0.074) 
0.3102* 
(0.113) 
0.1755* 
(0.079) 
0.3072 
(0.108) 
0.1460* 
(0.072) 
Dependent variablet-1 
0.3086* 
(0.127) 
0.2713* 
(0.121) 
0.2075* 
(0.091) 
-0.3228 
(0.205) 
0.3102* 
(0.121) 
0.2710* 
(0.136) 
0.2061* 
(0.092) 
-0.3261 
(0.204) 
0.3035* 
(0.131) 
0.2708* 
(0.120) 
0.2056* 
(0.091) 
-0.3093 
(0.204) 
(Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1) t-1 - 
0.0717 
(0.052) - 
0.0424 
(0.152) - 
0.0715 
(0.052) - 
0.0422 
(0.143) - 
0.0717 
(0.061) - 
0.0407 
(0.118) 
Pre-crisis (1994-2006) vs. crisis (2007-2010) dummy - - - - -0.0263 (0.189) 
-0.0182 
(0.266) 
-0.0044 
(0.213) 
0.0032 
(0.126) 
-0.0262 
(0.220) 
-0.0016 
(0.169) 
-0.0029 
(0.224) 
-0.0102 
(0.183) 
(Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1) t-1 X pre-crisis (1994-2006) 
vs. crisis (2007-2010) dummy - - - - - - - - - 
-0.0417 
(0.218) - 
0.0073 
(0.038) 
Bank loans/total liabilities t-1 
0.5161** 
(0.064) - - - 
0.4890** 
(0.085) - - - 
0.4906** 
(0.071) - - - 
Bank loans/total liabilities t-1 X pre-crisis (1994-2006) vs. 
crisis (2007-2010) dummy (0,1) - - - - - - - - 
0.0928 
(0.132) - - - 
(Accounts payable/ total liabilities) t-1 - - 
0.1207 
(0.114) - - - 
0.1232 
(0.118) - - - 
0.1228 
(0.102) - 
(Accounts payable /total liabilities) t-1X pre-crisis (1994-2006) 
vs. crisis (2007-2010) dummy (0,1) - - 
-0.0054 
(0.014) - - - 
-0.0064 
(0.014) - - - 
-0.0067 
(0.014) - 
Interbank interest rates -0.1511* (0.068) 
-0.0851** 
(0.031) 
-0.1262** 
(0.047) 
-0.2329 
(0.214) 
-0.1611* 
(0.064) 
-0.0839** 
(0.037) 
-0.1262** 
(0.039) 
-0.2164 
(0.213) 
-0.1641* 
(0.071) 
-0.0813** 
(0.027) 
-0.1260** 
(0.040) 
-0.2153 
(0.235) 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1   
0.2178** 
(0.016) 
0.1325 
(0.128) 
0.1877** 
(0.016) 
-0.2326 
(0.124) 
0.2163** 
(0.021) 
0.1374 
(0.119) 
0.1907** 
(0.024) 
-0.2320 
(0.127) 
0.2123** 
(0.021) 
0.1322 
(0.126) 
0.1973** 
(0.018) 
-0.2257 
(0.129) 
Sales growth 0.1362** (0.039) 
0.3510 
(0.328) 
0.0603* 
(0.030) 
-0.2495 
(0.190) 
0.1261** 
(0.041) 
0.3532 
(0.318) 
0.0612* 
(0.026) 
-0.2503 
(0.171) 
0.1424** 
(0.039) 
0.3507 
(0.304) 
0.0621* 
(0.023) 
-0.2531 
(0.179) 
Defaults in trade credit  -0.1524* (0.071) 
-0.1601* 
(0.071) 
-0.1531* 
(0.062) 
-0.1262* 
(0.059) 
-0.1517* 
(0.072) 
-0.1614* 
(0.080) 
-0.1441* 
(0.061) 
-0.1263* 
(0.052) 
-0.1506* 
(0.065) 
-0.1589* 
(0.072) 
-0.1417* 
(0.061) 
-0.1283* 
(0.062) 
R2(first-stage) 0.86 0.84 0.79 0.88 0.87 0.82 0.80 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.90 
F-test for overall significance (p-value) 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.32 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.41 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.46 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.135 0.141 0.151 0.181 0.133 0.144 0.149 0.164 0.136 0.141 0.152 0.179 
Number of observations 217,742 217,742 217,742 217,742 217,742 217,742 217,742 217,742 217,742 217,742 217,742 217,742 
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PANEL B. PARTIALLY-CONSTRAINED FIRMS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Bank 
loans/total 
liabilities 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Accounts 
payable/ 
total 
liabilities 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Bank 
loans/total 
liabilities 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Accounts 
payable/ 
total 
liabilities 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Bank 
loans/total 
liabilities 
Capital 
expendituret/ 
capitalt-1 
Accounts 
payable/ 
total 
liabilities 
Constant 0.2032* (0.098) 
0.1843** 
(0.041) 
0.2512* 
(0.085) 
0.0641 
(0.156) 
0.2127* 
(0.084) 
0.1829** 
(0.038) 
0.2346* 
(0.089) 
0.0653 
(0.151) 
0.1893* 
(0.107) 
0.1812** 
(0.067) 
0.2532* 
(0.098) 
0.0623 
(0.155) 
Dependent variablet-1 
0.2013* 
(0.088) 
0.6482 
(0.553) 
0.1813* 
(0.080) 
-0.226* 
(0.118) 
0.2003* 
(0.082) 
0.6413 
(0.528) 
0.1817* 
(0.078) 
-0.2201* 
(0.091) 
0.2008* 
(0.092) 
0.6473 
(0.550) 
0.1816* 
(0.076) 
-0.214* 
(0.107) 
(Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1) t-1 - 
0.3108 
(0.266) - 
0.207 
(0.215) - 
0.3103 
(0.288) - 
0.2026 
(0.215) - 
0.3139 
(0.290) - 
0.216 
(0.213) 
Pre-crisis (1994-2006) vs. crisis (2007-2010) dummy - - - - -0.0061 (0.218) 
-0.0362 
(0.161) 
-0.0254 
(0.235) 
-0.0533 
(0.201) 
-0.0562 
(0.228) 
-0.0295 
(0.273) 
-0.0053 
(0.236)  
(Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1) t-1 X pre-crisis (1994-2006) 
vs. crisis (2007-2010) dummy (0,1) - - - - - - - - - 
0.0061 
(0.186) - 
0.0768 
(0.155) 
Bank loans/total liabilities t-1 
0.1324 
(0.121) - - - 
0.1317 
(0.120) - - - 
0.1314 
(0.129) - - - 
Bank loans/total liabilities t-1 X pre-crisis (1994-2006) vs. 
crisis (2007-2010) dummy (0,1) - - - - - - - - 
0.1206 
(0.014) - - - 
(Accounts payable/ total liabilities) t-1 - - 
0.1920* 
(0.084) - - - 
0.1837* 
(0.084) - - - 
0.1781* 
(0.072) - 
(Accounts payable /total liabilities) t-1X pre-crisis (1994-2006) 
vs. crisis (2007-2010) dummy (0,1) - - - - - - - - - - 
0.0306 
(0.037) - 
Interbank interest rates -0.1861* (0.031) 
-0.1029* 
(0.040) 
-0.1623* 
(0.071) 
-0.4132 
(0.238) 
-0.1803* 
(0.031) 
-0.1013* 
(0.035) 
-0.1612* 
(0.071) 
-0.4005 
(0.217) 
-0.1832* 
(0.033) 
-0.1031* 
(0.062) 
-0.1609* 
(0.086) 
-0.4096 
(0.262) 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1   
0.2527* 
(0.106) 
0.171 
(0.159) 
0.2628** 
(0.043) 
-0.2108 
(0.136) 
0.2560* 
(0.119) 
0.1604 
(0.129) 
0.2620** 
(0.037) 
-0.2105 
(0.132) 
0.2564* 
(0.110) 
0.1728 
(0.154) 
0.2607** 
(0.038) 
-0.2182 
(0.140) 
Sales growth 0.1397* (0.061) 
0.4407 
(0.335) 
0.1381* 
(0.065) 
-0.2039* 
(0.095) 
0.1441* 
(0.059) 
0.4128 
(0.335) 
0.1363* 
(0.064) 
-0.2108* 
(0.091) 
0.1216* 
(0.071) 
0.4407 
(0.321) 
0.1373* 
(0.071) 
-0.216* 
(0.084) 
Defaults in trade credit  -0.1795* (0.088) 
-0.2317* 
(0.095) 
-0.1814* 
(0.093) 
-0.1361* 
(0.064) 
-0.1728* 
(0.092) 
-0.2384* 
(0.089) 
-0.182* 
(0.091) 
-0.1329* 
(0.068) 
-0.1827* 
(0.092) 
-0.2326* 
(0.090) 
-0.1856* 
(0.091) 
-0.143* 
(0.061) 
R2(first-stage) 0.88 0.84 0.89 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.91 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.91 
F-test for overall significance (p-value) 0.012 0.031 0.032 0.061 0.014 0.031 0.035 0.061 0.012 0.031 0.033 0.062 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.116 0.130 0.111 0.108 0.115 0.130 0.112 0.112 0.119 0.130 0.115 0.108 
Number of observations 106,229 106,229 106,229 106,229 106,229 106,229 106,229 106,229 106,229 106,229 106,229 106,229 
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PANEL C. FULLY-CONSTRAINED FIRMS
 (1) (2)   (5) (6)   (9) (10)   
 
Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Accounts 
payable/ 
total 
liabilities 
  Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Accounts 
payable/ 
total 
liabilities 
  Capital 
expendituret
/ capitalt-1 
Accounts 
payable/ 
total liabilities 
  
Constant 0.3226* (0.084) 
0.2817* 
(0.087) 
  0.3215* 
(0.160) 
0.2934* 
(0.141) 
  0.3264* 
(0.083) 
0.2951* 
(0.080)   
Dependent variablet-1 
0.1471* 
(0.064) 
-0.4164* 
(0.096) 
  0.1407* 
(0.063) 
-0.4105* 
(0.087) 
  0.1463* 
(0.072) 
-0.4160* 
(0.093)   
(Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1) t-1 - 
0.3043 
(0.327) 
  - 0.3128 (0.326) 
  - 0.3119 (0.345)   
Pre-crisis (1994-2006) vs. crisis (2007-2010) dummy - -   -0.0123* (0.088) 
-0.0098 
(0.183) 
  -0.0135* 
(0.069) 
0.0102* 
(0.174)   
(Capital expendituret/ capitalt-1) t-1 X pre-crisis (1994-2006) vs. crisis 
(2007-2010) dummy (0,1) - - 
  - -   - 0.0860 (0.110)   
(Accounts payable/total liabilities) t-1 
0.2036** 
(0.031) - 
  0.2392** 
(0.031) - 
  0.2353** 
(0.037) -   
(Accounts payable /total liabilities) t-1X pre-crisis (1994-2006) vs. 
crisis (2007-2010) dummy (0,1) - - 
  - -   0.1126* (0.054) -   
Interbank interest rates -0.1203* (0.064) 
-0.2163 
(0.188) 
  -0.1207* 
(0.064) 
-0.2367 
(0.185) 
  -0.1201* 
(0.061) 
-0.2301 
(0.183)   
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1   
0.2452** 
(0.037) 
-0.2219 
(0.176) 
  0.2461** 
(0.034) 
-0.2225 
(0.179) 
  0.2463** 
(0.035) 
-0.2156 
(0.170)   
Sales growth 0.1893* (0.096) 
-0.0153 
(0.132) 
  0.1951* 
(0.079) 
-0.0151 
(0.115) 
  0.1970* 
(0.088) 
-0.0150 
(0.012)   
Defaults in trade credit  -0.1804* (0.081) 
-0.2137* 
(0.074) 
  -0.1863* 
(0.081) 
-0.2175* 
(0.076) 
  -0.1816* 
(0.082) 
-0.2163* 
(0.071)   
R2(first-stage) 0.88 0.75   0.86 0.73   0.85 0.74   
F-test for overall significance (p-value) 0.014 0.054   0.014 0.050   0.014 0.048   
Hansen test (p-value) 0.130 0.173   0.137 0.180   0.133 0.176   
Number of observations 15,130 15,130   15,130 15,130   15,130 15,130   
             
* significantly different from zero at 5% level 
** significantly different from zero at 1% level 
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FIGURE 1. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AS A FRACTION OF CAPITAL: EVOLUTION 
OVER THE SAMPLE PERIOD 
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APPENDIX A. DEFINTION OF THE POSITED VARIABLES 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 
INVESTMENT VARIABLE 
Capital expendituret / capitalt-1 
The ratio of total capital expenditure at end-year relative to the total amount of capital at the 
beginning of the year is our investment variable (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Fazzari et al., 
2000). Capital expenditure is computed as the annual change in net fixed assets plus 
depreciation. 
 
VARIABLES RELATED TO FINANCING DECISIONS 
Bank loans Outstanding amount of loans in the liability side of firm’s balance sheet (thousand of euros) 
Banks loans/total liabilities A ratio that reflects bank-leverage, the relevance of bank loans as a source of external finance. 
Credit period Number of days the trade credit is extended to firms. 
Accounts payable / total liabilities It reflects the importance of trade credit relative to other sources of financing. 
 
FIRM-LEVEL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL VARIABLES 
Total assets Total assets on firm’s balance sheet (thousand of euros) 
Tangible assets Fixed assets on firm’s balance sheet (thousand of euros). This is considered as proxy of collateral. 
Cash flow Net income plus depreciation plus changes in deferred taxes. 
Cash flowt/ capitalt-1 
This ratio is defined as cash flow in relative terms to the proportion of capital at the end of the 
previous year (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000; Fazzari et al., 2000) 
Sales Total sales during the year (thousand of euros) 
Sales growth 
Sales growth offers another alternative measure of firm financing constraints. It has been 
employed as a measure of investment opportunities and current cash-flows, which are expected 
to reduce borrowing constraints and as an indicator of financial distress for constrained firms 
(Fazzari et al., 2000, Lamont et al., 2001). 
Interbank interest rates 
The three-month interbank deposit rate, obtained from the Bank of Spain, and computed as the 
average monthly rate over the year.  This interest rate controls for the costs of external 
financing. A shock to interest rates may affect both bank lending and trade credit (Nielsen, 
2002; Fukuda et al., 2006). 
Loan interest spread 
This spread is defined as the difference between loan interest rates and interbank rates. The 
loan interest rate is computed as a ratio of loan expenses and bank loans outstanding.  We 
implicitly assume that the year-end loan balance is roughly equal to the weighted average 
balance during the year. 
Default risk This risk variable is defined as the ratio of operating profits to interest paid. A proxy for operating risk showing how many times interest paid are covered by operating profits. 
Banks ’market power 
Bank market power is measured estimating the Lerner index (%). This index defined as the 
ratio “(price of total assets - marginal costs of total assets)/price”. Marginal costs are estimated 
from a translog cost function with a single output (total assets) and three inputs (deposits, labor 
and physical capital) using two stage least squares and bank fixed effects (Cetorelli and 
Gambera, 2001). 
House price index Annual growth in house prices in the region where the firm is located 
Market growth (growth of the number of 
firms) Annual growth in the number of firms in the industry where the observed firm operates. 
Defaults in trade credit 
This is a regional measure of the growth in defaults on trade credit in the region where the firm 
operates. It provides a control for trade credit quality. This is the only business default rate 
available at the regional level. 
GDP growth Annual growth of regional GDP in the region where the firm is located 
Crisis dummy A dummy variable distinguishing the pre-crisis (1994-2006) and crisis (2007-2010). It takes the value 1 in the crisis period and zero otherwise.  
 
RELATIONSHIP LENDING VARIABLES 
Age of the firm  Number of years since the firm was created 
Length (n. years relationship) Number of years of bank-firm relationship with the main bank 
Single vs. multiple bank relationships  A dummy that takes the value 0 if the relationship is just with one bank and 1 if it is with more than 1 bank. 
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APPENDIX B. SIMPLE CORRELATIONS AMONG THE VARIABLES 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
(1) Capital expendituret / 
capitalt-1 
1.00 0.68 0.61 0.16 0.43 0.54 0.37 0.49 0.38 0.31 0.38 -0.24 -0.32 -0.19 -0.18 0.09 0.20 -0.26 0.48 0.13 0.36 -0.08 
(2) Bank loans - 1.00 0.89 0.30 -0.18 0.26 0.39 0.53 0.50 0.61 0.58 -0.17 -0.36 -0.14 -0.12 0.06 0.15 -0.13 0.37 0.44 -0.19 -0.39 
(3) Banks loans/total liabilities - - 1.00 0.26 -0.13 0.23 0.32 0.46 0.43 0.58 0.50 -0.13 -0.24 -0.09 -0.07 0.03 0.12 -0.08 0.29 0.32 -0.15 -0.31 
(4) Credit period - - - 1.00 -0.10 0.19 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.37 0.43 -0.11 -0.16 -0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.18 0.23 -0.02 -0.09 
(5) Accounts payable / total 
liabilities - - - - 1.00 0.08 0.28 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.48 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 0.08 0.13 -0.01 0.13 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 
(6) Total assets - - - - - 1.00 0.69 0.47 0.43 0.51 0.35 0.03 0.05 -0.09 -0.02 0.05 0.18 -0.08 0.15 0.59 0.64 0.60 
(7) Tangible assets - - - - - - 1.00 0.40 0.36 0.40 0.28 0.06 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.08 0.16 -0.06 0.19 0.49 0.53 0.41 
(8) Cash flow - - - - - - - 1.00 0.78 0.72 0.05 0.08 0.06 -0.13 0.08 0.07 0.15 -0.05 0.32 0.31 0.18 0.15 
(9) Cash flowt/ capitalt-1 - - - - - - - - 1.00 0.63 0.03 0.10 0.08 -0.17 0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.02 0.21 0.22 0.13 0.08 
(10) Sales - - - - - - - - - 1.00 0.13 0.18 0.11 -0.18 -0.20 0.19 0.17 -0.09 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.13 
(11) Sales growth - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 0.11 0.08 -0.15 -0.26 0.23 0.14 -0.06 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.10 
(12) Interbank interest rates - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 0.28 -0.19 0.18 -0.19 -0.23 0.26 -0.49 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 
(13) Loan interest spread - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 -0.13 0.12 -0.28 -0.08 0.10 -0.31 -0.04 -0.09 0.18 
(14) Default risk - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 0.06 -0.16 -0.13 0.54 -0.33 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
(15) Banks ’market power - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 0.15 -0.06 -0.18 0.23 -0.46 0.32 -0.24 
(16) House price index - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 0.45 -0.16 0.52 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
(17) Market growth (growth of 
the number of firms) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 -0.08 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.08 
(18) Defaults in trade credit - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 -0.41 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 
(19) GDP growth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 
(20) Age of the firm  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 0.41 0.26 
(21) Length (n. years 
relationship) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 -0.13 
(22) Single vs. multiple bank 
relationships  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00 
